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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
KIRK A. LOFTIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No. 39670-2012 
Ada Co. No. CR-FE-2003-1501 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Did the court have subject-matter jurisdiction to impose judgment for a felony since the 
Information in this case failed to allege either the correct statute or facts constituting the charged 
offense's necessary element of willful infliction of a traumatic injury? 
II. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED 
The Court of Appeals has decided an issue not in accord with the decisions of this Court. 
I.AR. 11 S(b )(2). 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correctanjllegal sentence. 
~ ', "'"~'~'""-'"""'""""--,,---... ,.,,,.,,. ___ , 
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I • BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Appellant Kirk Loftis asks this Court to accept review, vacate the felony judgment, and remand 
for imposition of a misdemeanor sentence with credit for time served. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
Mr. Loftis was charged by Information with a single count of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child. CR 21 1• The Information alleged, in pertinent part: 
CR21. 
KIRK A LOFTIS is/are accused by this Information of the crime(s) of: 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY, LC. 
§18-903, 918(7)(b) which crime(s) was/were committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day of October, 
2003, in the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did actually, intentionally and 
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of Kim Richards, to wit: by 
punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by her hair and strangling 
her by the neck, while in the presence of a child, to wit four ( 4) years 
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household members. 
Mr. Loftis went to trial on the charge and was convicted. T p. 151, In. 11-17. He was 
sentenced to a term of twenty years with ten years fixed. CR 79. A Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed. CR 86. 
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Loftis, 2007 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 349, Docket No. 31003 (Ct. App. 2007), review denied. The Court of Appeals 
rejected Mr. Loftis's argument under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) and Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979), that the state had not proved that he and Ms. Richards were 
household members at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals found they were household 
1 This Court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript in State 
v. Loftis, No. 31102 by order dated May 2, 2012. The original clerk's record will be cited as 
"CR." The limited clerk's record prepared for this appeal will be cited as "LCR." "T" refers to 
the transcripts of the trial proceedings in Docket No. 31102. 
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members because they were cohabitating under the definition of cohabitation found in State v. 
Hansell, 141 Idaho 587,590, 114 P.3d 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2005). Hansell held that two people 
were cohabitants ( and thus "household members") if they lived together. 
Mr. Loftis argued in this 2007 Petition for Review to this Court that Ransell's definition 
of cohabitants was incorrect. Unfortunately for him, this Court did not address that issue until 
much later. When it finally did, however, it confirmed that Mr. Loftis had been right all along: 
"The holding in Hansell, on which the State heavily relies, does not affect our conclusion 
because it is an incorrect reading of the statute and, in any event, decisions of the Court of 
Appeals are not binding on this Court." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,867,264 P.3d 970, 974 
(2011 ). Thus, Mr. Loftis' s argument was ahead of its time. If his direct appeal were pending 
today, the Court of Appeals would be required to vacate the judgment and remand to the trial 
court for entry of a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor battery under Schulz. 
On December 19, 2011, Mr. Loftis filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under 
I.C.R. 35(a) and a brief in support of the motion. LCR 7-8; 9-13. In his brief, Mr. Loftis 
correctly noted that "[n]o person can be punished for a public offense except upon a legal 
conviction in a court having jurisdiction thereof." LCR 10, quoting I.C. § 19-101. He went on to 
argue that the charging document in the case was insufficient to confer felony jurisdiction on the 
district court and all he was charged with was misdemeanor simple battery under LC. § 18-903. 
LCR 10-11. He also alerted the court to this Court's opinion in State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 
P.3d 1255 (2011), where the Court wrote "where it is apparent from the record that the act that 
the defendant was criminally convicted for is not a crime according to the laws of this state, this 
court has the authority to vacate the conviction sua sponte ... "Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d 
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at 1258, quoting State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,484, 80 P.3d 1083, 1085 (2003). LCR 11. 
The district court denied the motion reasoning as follows: 
The maximum sentence for committing Domestic Violence in the Presence of a 
Child is twenty (20) years. LC.§ 18-918(2), (4). Thus, Mr. Loftis's twenty-year 
sentence is fixed within the limits of the statute, and the sentence does not need to 
be corrected. 
To the extent that Mr. Loftis challenging his conviction on the basis that it was 
improperly titled, his argument is frivolous. Section 18-918 is clearly titled 
"Domestic Violence." To the extent that Mr. Loftis is challenging the 
constitutionality of his conviction, his arguments are untimely. 
LCR 16. 
This appeal timely followed. LCR 18. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed writing: 
Here, the information accused Loftis of "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully 
commit[ing] a traumatic injury .... " A fair and reasonable reading of this 
language plainly indicates that Loftis purposefully inflicted said injury. 
Consequently, the facts contained in the information are sufficient to allege that 
the act was done "willfully." 
2013 Unpublished Opinion, No. 529, pg. 4. (A true and correct copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion is attached as Exhibit A.) 
A timely Petition for Review was filed. 
IV. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals held that the word "intentionally" was sufficient to 
allege that he was charged with "willfully" inflicting a traumatic injury. That is incorrect. 
"Intentionally" only alleges a general intent to commit a battery, i.e., an intentional touching. It 
is not a substitute for the word "willfully," which alleges that Mr. Loftis purposefully inflicted a 
traumatic injury, as opposed to purposefully committed a battery. The Information only alleged a 
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general intent crime, not a specific intent crime, which is the difference in this case between a 
felony and a misdemeanor. Thus, as shown below, the Court of Appeals' decision here is in 
conflict with the decisions of this Court and review should be granted. 
A. Standard of Review 
Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an information, 
indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho. State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004). 
The claim that an information fails to charge an offense and was jurisdictionally deficient 
can be raised at any time, including in an I.C.R. 35 motion, and even for the first time on appeal. 
See l.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 300, 1 P.3d 795, 801(2000); State v. Cahoon, 
116 Idaho 399,400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989); see also State v. Lute, supra Gurisdictional 
challenge raised for the first time in a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence). When a 
challenge to the information is not raised before trial, the charging document will "be upheld 
unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge an offense 
for which the defendant is convicted." Id. 
A tardily-challenged Information must allege at least one of the following two things in 
order to be found to confer jurisdiction: 1) the correct code section; or 2) facts constituting the 
crime charged. State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006). This 
is one of those rare cases where the Information, even under its most liberal construction, fails to 
allege either of those and thus does not charge a felony offense. Consequently, it did not confer 
subject-matter jurisdiction on the court for anything other than a misdemeanor offense and the 
twenty-year sentence imposed is illegal. 
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B. The Information Does Not Allege the Correct Code Section 
In Jones and Cahoon, the Court held that when an objection to a charging document is 
not made until after the entry of judgment, if the applicable code section is named in the charging 
document, its language may be read into the text of the charge. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758-59, 101 
P.3d at 702-03; Cahoon, 116 Idaho at 400, 775 P.2d at 1242. In those cases, however, the 
charging document named the applicable code section under which the defendant was charged. 
In this case, the correct code section was never named. The Information alleged a violation of 
"LC. §18-903, 918(7)(b)[.]" CR 21. Section 903 of Title 18 is the general battery statute. In 
October of 2003, Section 918(3) of Title 18 was the felony domestic violence statute2 and 
Section 9 l 8(7)(b) was a penalty enhancement provision. Thus, the state failed to name the 
applicable code section for felony domestic battery in 2003 - LC. § 918(3) - and the rule in 
Jones and Cahoon mentioned above does not save the Information. 
C. The Information Does Not Allege All the Facts Necessary to Constitute the Charge 
At the time of the offense, the state was required to prove that Mr. Loftis and Kim 
Richards were "household members," that Mr. Loftis committed "a battery, as defined in section 
18-903, Idaho Code, and [that he] willfully and unlawfully inflict[ ed] a traumatic injury." LC. § 
18-918(3) (2003). The Information, however, omitted the willfulness element and only alleged 
that he "did actually, intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of 
Kim Richards, to wit: by punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by her hair and 
strangling her by the neck ... where Kim Richards and the defendant are household members." 
CR 21-22. These allegations are insufficient to charge an offense because the statute in 2003 
2 Now renumbered as§ 18-918(2). 2009 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 80, § 3, p. 221. 
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required the specific intent to cause a traumatic injury. State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458,460, 95 
P.3d 76, 78 (Ct. App. 2004)3• The Court of Appeals wrote that "[i]n order for Sohm to be found 
guilty of domestic battery, the state was required to prove not only that he committed a battery 
but also that he willfully inflicted a traumatic injury upon another household member. I.C. § 
18-918(3)." (Emphasis in original.) Additionally, willfulness was found to be a "material 
element of the offense." Id. All the Information here alleges is a general intent offense, i.e., that 
Mr. Loftis intentionally committed a battery. Thus, the total failure to allege a material element 
of the offense did not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the court. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' analysis of the charging document here is in conflict with the 
Court's opinion in Jones. The Court should follow the two-part analysis set forth in Jones and 
find that: 1) the correct code section was not alleged in the Information and 2) no facts were set 
forth which, in any form or by fair construction, can be found to have alleged that Mr. Loftis 
willfully inflicted a traumatic injury. Accordingly, the trial court did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to sentence for a felony offense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the judgment and sentence and 
remand for a sentence on the misdemeanor charge of simple battery. 
Respectfully submitted thisl~~ay of July, 2013. 
~~~~-
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Kirk A. Loftis 
3 As recognized in State v. Murray, 143 Idaho at 535-36, 148 P.3d at 1281-82, Sohm was 
modified by this Court on other grounds in State v. Jones 140 Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on July\~, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be 
~mailed 
hand delivered 
faxed 
to: Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
u~s. ,<~---~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 39670 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
KIRK A. LOFTIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 529 
Filed: June 10, 2013 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY 
----------------~) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge. 
Order denying motion to vacate conviction, affirmed. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP; Dennis A. Benjamin, Boise, for 
appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
LANSING, Judge 
Kirk Loftis appeals the district court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. He contends that his sentence is illegal because the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the felony charge for which Loftis was convicted and 
sentenced. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In late 2003, Kirk Loftis and Kim Richards were living together. Although they had 
signed a lease together, the stress of unemployment had strained the relationship, and in 
September Richards asked Loftis to move out. Over the next few days the two talked, 
presumably in an attempt to reconcile, but on October 1, the discussion deteriorated into a 
violent confrontation. Richards later testified that Loftis hit her, wrestled with her, pulled her 
hair, choked her, pushed her, and the like. Richards' daughter was present for the struggle. A 
EXHIBITA 
neighbor who witnessed part of the fight called the police. The State filed an information 
charging Loftis as follows: 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY, 
LC. § 18-903, 918(7)(6) which crimes was/were committed as follows: 
That Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day of October, 
2003, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did actually, intentionally and 
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of Kim Richards, to-wit: 
by punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by the hair and strangling 
her by the neck, while in the presence of a child, to-wit: [A.R.,] four (4) years 
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household members. 
After a trial, Loftis was found guilty of felony domestic violence in the presence of 
children. In 2011, Loftis filed a motion to vacate his sentence and/or conviction on the ground 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. According to Loftis, the information was 
sufficient to allege only misdemeanor domestic violence, and the district court therefore lacked 
jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for a felony. The district court denied the motion. 
On appeal, Loftis again asserts that his felony conviction and sentence are illegal and 
should be vacated because the district court lacked jurisdiction. He argues that he should be 
sentenced on remand for misdemeanor battery because that is the only offense for which the 
charging information conferred jurisdiction on the district court. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides an avenue for a defendant to correct an illegal sentence, 
and such a motion may be filed "at any time." Here, Loftis's challenge to his sentence is actually 
a challenge to the underlying felony conviction. Idaho courts have long held that Rule 35 may 
not be used as a means-to collaterally attack a conviction. See State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 725, 
85 P.3d 1117, 1124 (Ct. App. 2003); Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 889, 811 P.2d 495, 499 
(Ct. App. 1991). However, in State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 P.3d 1255 (2011), the Idaho 
Supreme Court entertained a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction that was 
presented through a Rule 35 motion. The Corni said, "[W]herc a court properly has jurisdiction 
to consider a case--as it does here to consider Lute's [Ruic] 35 motion--and it is apparent that 
there is an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted for 
something that is not a crime, this Court must correct that error." lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 
2 
P.3d at 1258. Therefore, we will consider Loftis's challenge to the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction presented via his Rule 35 motion. 
In criminal cases, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on a court by the filing of an 
information alleging that an offense, as defined by Idaho law, was committed within the State of 
Idaho. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004). See also Lute, 150 
Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258. The district court's jurisdictional power, therefore, depends on 
the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758, 
101 P.3d at 702. Whether a charging document is legally sufficient is a question of law subject 
to free review. Id. at 757, 101 P.3d at 701. Such a challenge may be raised at any time, 
including for the first time on appeal. Id. 
While a challenge to the information's sufficiency can be heard at any time, the standard 
against which the information is measured differs depending upon when the challenge is brought. 
State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 167-68, 75 P.3d 219, 221-22 (Ct. App. 2003). If an alleged 
deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or entry of a guilty plea, the charging document 
must set forth all facts essential to establish the charged offense to survive the challenge. Id. at 
168, 75 P.3d at 222. This requires only "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged." State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 
491,493 (Ct. App. 1991). When the information's sufficiency is not challenged until after trial, 
the standard is lower, and the information "will be upheld unless it is so defective that it does 
not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge [the] offense for which the defendant [was] 
convicted." Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703 (quoting Robran, 119 Idaho at 287, 805 
P.2d at 493). This standard affords the reviewing court "considerable leeway to imply the 
necessary allegations from the language of the Information." Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P .3d 
at 703. When the objection to the charging document is not made until after entry of judgment, 
if the applicable code section is named in the charging document its language may be read into 
the text of the charge. Id. 
At the time of Loftis's offense, a felony conviction for domestic violence required that an 
individual both "commit[] a battery" and "willfully and unlawfully inflict[] a traumatic injury." 
3 
LC. § 18-918(3) (2003); 1 State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505-06, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106-07 (Ct. 
App. 2003). Loftis acknowledges that the information alleged that he committed a battery, but 
contends that it did not adequately allege that he willfully inflicted a traumatic injury. Therefore, 
the only issue on appeal is whether a fair and reasonable reading of the information implies the 
necessary element of willful infliction of traumatic injury. 
Idaho Code informs us that the word "willfully" refers to the "intent with which an act is 
done ... [, and] implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act .... " LC. § 18-
101 (I). 2 Idaho case law has long found common ground between the term "willfully" and the 
term "intentionally." See Archbold v. Huntington, 34 Idaho 558, 565, 201 P. 1041, 1043 (1921) 
(willfully is "nearly synonymous with 'intentionally' 'designedly' 'without lawful excuse,' and 
therefore not accidental"); State v. Hall, 90 Idaho 478, 489-90, 413 P.2d 685, 692 (1966) (citing 
Archbold and noting that willfully "implies the conscious commission of a wrong"); State v. 
Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 783, 992 P.2d 775, 778 (1999) (approving the district court's reasoning 
that, "The word 'willfully' ... is ... nearly synonymous with 'intentionally."'). Here, the 
information accused Loftis of "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully commit[ting] a traumatic 
injury .... " A fair and reasonable reading of this language plainly indicates that Loftis 
purposefully inflicted said injury. Consequently, the facts contained in the information are 
sufficient to allege that the act was done "willfully." 
Because the information's factual allegations assert all the charged crime's necessary 
elements, we need not consider whether the information's citation of Idaho Code§§ 18-903 and 
l 8-9 l 8(7)(b) was sufficient to allow the court to read into the information all necessary elements 
of the charged offense. Nor do we need at this time to determine whether correctly titling the 
offense in the charging document would be sufficient (either alone or in combination with other 
Section 18-918 was reordered in 2004, so that felony domestic battery was thereafter LC. 
§ 18-918(2)(a) & (b). 2004 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 118 at 393. Additionally, in 2005 the Idaho 
Legislature deleted the words "willfully and unlawfully." 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 158 at 
488. 
2 While certain cases have limited the definition found in I.C. § 18-101 (1) with regard to 
crimes such as J.C. § 18-918; they have done so merely to eliminate the circularity introduced by 
inclusion of the second sentence, which would eviscerate the plain meaning of the term within 
the context of those statutory sections. See, e.g., State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372-73, 
64 P.3d 296, 298-99 (2001); State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458, 460-61, 95 P.3d 76, 78-79 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
4 
indications of the crime alleged) to impart subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, we need not 
address Loftis's premise that an information which alleged only a misdemeanor would not confer 
"jurisdiction" for a felony conviction, as opposed to presenting a due process issue that would be 
waived if not raised before a trial or guilty plea. We do, however, reject the argument that 
jurisdiction can be conferred only by verbatim recitation of statutory language (e.g., "willfully") 
or explicit reference to an Idaho Code subsection number (e.g., I.C. § 18-918(3)). See, e.g., 
Robran,119 Idaho at 288, 805 P.2d at 494. 
The district court's order denying Loftis's Rule 35 motion is affirmed. 
Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
5 
